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RIGHT TO WORK LAWS AND TAFT-HARTLEY
-EFFECT UPON THE AGENCY SHOP
I. INTRODUCTION
During the growth of organized labor, various forms of
union security agreements have gained prominence in the
field of labor-management relations. Despite the outcries
of "free choice for the workingman", advocates of these
systems have stressed freedom of association and the right
of the majority to speak for the whole.1  The closed shop,
which was the most popular of these agreements prior to
1947, conditioned employment upon union membership and
no hiring was done of any laborer who did not first obtain a
union card. 2  Under the Wagner Act,3 these agreements
were permitted; however, with the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley proposal, unionism in the closed shop category was
abolished.4  As a result of this enactment the union shop,
expressly provided for in Taft-Hartley,5 came into the lime-
light since the arrangement does not necessitate membership
as a prior condition for work, but forces the employee to
attain membership after thirty days as a condition of
continued employment.
The agency shop is an arrangement whereby non-union
employees, working in an establishment where a union has
been named exclusive bargaining agent, are assessed by con-
tract a fixed sum to defray costs expended by the union in
representing such non-members.6  The agency Shop
provision has been referred to as the "support money clause",
the "Rand Formula" and the "bargaining agent fee". 7
Although Taft - Hartley is silent, recent interpretation8 has
declared the agency shop a permissive scheme between
employer and employee, much the same as it was under the
1. See generally Sultan, Historical Antecedents to the Right-to-Work
Controversy, 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 221 (1958).
2. See Millis and Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation 1937-1947
15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 282 (1948).
3. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
4. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1956).
5. Ibid.
6. See Jones, The Agency Shop, 10 Lab. L.J. 781 (1959).
7. Ibid.
8. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 371 U.S. 908 (1963).
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Wagner Act.9  The proponents of this system stress the
need for elimination of the "free rider", i.e. the employee
who accepts the benefits of the bargainer but who is unwilling
to assume any of the financial burden of supporting the union.
The full impact of the agency shop upon the working mass
is realized when the provision encounters a state having right
to work legislation that supposedly guarantees laboring
freedom to its residents. 10
II. THE EFFECT OF TAFT-HARTLEY UPON
RIGHT TO WORK LEGISLATION
Under section 14 (b) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947,11 Congress granted to the states the power to
outlaw union shop agreements by stating:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as author-
izing the execution or application of agreements
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory
in which such execution or application is prohibited
by State or Territorial law.
12
Some states had adopted right to work statutes prior to this
enactment. This section served as a stimulus for others
to enact such legislation since section 14(b) takes precedent
over section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the same act which states
in relevant parts:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7
(rights of employees);
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization; PROVIDED, That nothing in this
Act, or in any other statute of the United States,
shall preclude an employer from making an agree-
ment with a labor organization . . . to require as a
condition of employment membership therein on or
after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of such agreement
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whichever is the later, ... Provided further, That no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an
employee for nonmembership in a labor organization
(B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing
that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniform-
ly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership, . . . 13
At present there are twenty states with right to work
statutes, constitutional amendments, or both, designed to
prohibit compulsory unionism. 14  The constitutionality of
these right to work statutes was upheld by the Supreme Court
of the United States in 1949 when they passed upon the validity
of Arizona 1' and North Carolina statutes. 16  The phraseology
of the statutes in eight of these right to work jurisdictions"
varies but generally reads:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or nonmember-
ship in any labor organization; provided, that this
clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the
right of employees by and through a labor organization
or labor union to bargain collectively with their
employer.:'
Unions, in an attempt to circumvent the statutes, have
used the strict interpretation sometimes given to the phrase
"agreements requiring membership"'19 to their advantage
and responded with the agency shop clause. This does not
9. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 89 NLRB 418 (1950).
10. See Rose, The Agency Shop v. The Right-to-Work Law, 9 Lab. L.J.
579 (1958); McConkey, Was the Agency Shop Prematurely Scrapped, 9 Lab.
L.J. 150 (1958).
11. For text of Act see U.S. Code Cong. Serv., 80th Congress, 1st Sess., 135
(1947). This Act and Taft-Hartley are one and the same and amend the
National Labor Relations Act.
12. 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 164 (195G).
13. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 158 (1956).
14. Infra notes 17 and 19 for listing of statutes and breakdown into
categories.
15. American Fed. of Labor v. American S. & D. Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
16. Lincoln Fed. L.U. v. Northwestern I. & M. Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
17. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1302 (1956); Ariz. Const. art. 25 (1956); Fla.
Const. Dec. of Rts. § 12 (1959); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 40-2701 (Supp. 1963); Kan.
Const. art. 15 § 12 (G.S. 1961 Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.250 (1961); N.D.
Cent. Code § 34-01-14 (1960); S.D. Code § 17-1101 (Supp. 1960); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5154g (1962).
18. Fla. Const. Dec. of Rts. § 12 (1959).
19. See supra note 12. (This phrase is found in Section 14(b) of Taft-
Hartley).
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make actual membership mandatory but does require assess-
ments equal to initiation fees plus dues. Of these twenty
states, the remaining twelve have statutes 20 providing further
that:
No employer shall require any person to pay any
dues, fees, or other charges of any kind to any labor
union, labor organization or any other type of associ-
ation as a condition of employment or continuation
of employment.2 1
This further provision completely precludes the agency shop
as well as the union shop. This article is directed at those
states whose right to work laws are founded on membership
only, thus clouding the basic problem of the "free rider"
principle and creating an additional one of statuatory
construction.
III. STATE DECISIONS AND THEIR EFFECT
Indiana in 1959 decided the landmark case directly posing
the issue of whether an agency shop provision was valid in
a right to work jurisdiction.2 2  In Meade Electric Company
v. Hagberg23 the complaint alleged that Local 697, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which had been
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as exclusive
bargaining agent for all of the electricians in the motor
division of plaintiff company, had attempted to include an
agency shop clause in the contract which violated the Indiana
right to work statute. The company requested a permanent
injunction restraining the defendant from attempting to
incorporate such a clause. The Lake Superior Court entered
20. Ala. Code, tit. 26 § 375 (1958); Ark. Const. Amend. 34 (1960); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 81-202 (1960); Ga. Code Ann. § 54-902 (1961); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 736A.1 (1950); Miss. Code Ann. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1962); Neb. Const.'art. 15
§ 13 (1956); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-217 (Supp. 1961); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-78
(1958); S.C. Code § 40-46 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-208 (1955);
Utah Code Ann. § 34-16-2 (Supp. 1963); Va. Code Ann. 3 40-68 (1953). In
Maryland union shops are contrary to public policy, but the statute merely
makes such agreements unenforceable, Md. Ann. Code art. 100 §g 63-64
(1957).
21. Utah Code Ann. § 34-16-2 (Supp. 1963).
22. Meade Elec. Co. v. I-agberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
But see Arizona Flame Restaurant, Inc. v. Baldwin, 34 L.R.R.M. 2707
(Superior Court, Maricopa County, 1954) affirmed and modifled 82 Ariz.
385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957). The Arizona Supreme Court did not find it neces-
sary to decide the question of whether the agency shop was unlawful,
however, the trial court construing the right to work statute held that
form of union-security unlawful under Arizona law.
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judgment for the union and upon appeal the decision was
affirmed.
Judge Kelley in the majority opinion placed special
emphasis upon the penalty provision included in the right to
work law2 4 and reasoned that penal statutes are strictly
construed and not enlarged by construction. In the course
of his opinion he said:
The Indiana Right to Work Law is plain and
unambiguous, and there is no prohibition against the
requirement of the payment of fees or charges to
a labor organization. The Indiana Law merely
prohibits agreements and conduct which conditions
employment on membership in a labor organization.25
Strengthening his position, he submitted that had the legis-
lature intended to prohibit the payment of fees they would
have explicitly so stated in the statute since Indiana was the
nineteenth state to adopt such a law. The crux of the decision
turns on the inclusion of the penal provision in the statute
as it allows the court to interpret the word membership in its
narrowest sense.
This precedent stood unchallenged for a period of almost
two years until the Supreme Court of Kansas reached a
conflicting conclusion. 26 In the Higgins case nonunion
employees, covered by a collective bargaining agreement
which contained an agency shop provision, sought to enjoin
the application of the agreement to prevent their discharge
for failure to pay certain charges assessed them by the
provision. The union asserted the same line of reasoning
should be applied to the construction of Kansas' law that
Indiana applied to their statute. However, the right to work
enactment here was a constitutional amendment which did not
contain a penalty clause 27 as found in the Indiana statute.
2 8
Using this variation as a guidepost, the court said:
23. 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
24. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 40-2705 (Supp. 1963) which declares that violation
of the right to work law is a misdeameanor punishable by fine or im-
prisonment.
25. Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg supra note 22, at 413.
26. Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 829 (1961).
27. Kan. Const. art. 15 § 12 (G.S. 1961 Supp.)
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Here the court is not confronted with a penal
statute to be strictly construed, but a remedial
constitutional amendment to be liberally construed to
effectuate the purpose for which it was adopted.2 9
Reviewing the statutes' legislative history in Kansas, the
court investigated the federal decisions involving unions under
federal legislation.30  It was concluded that by the terms of
section 8(a) (3) (b) of Taft-Hartley, the authority granted
was not to compel membership in the union, but merely
permitted the unions to require workers to pay dues and
initiation fees to support the union. Using this interpretation,
union and agency shops become synonomous and the term
membership in the right to work law must preclude not only
formal membership, but any payment of fees or dues. They
felt the alternative definition applied in the Indiana court
would declare the constitutional amendment meaningless.
The court also dealt with the problem of whether the
granting of injunctive relief was in the exclusive domain of
the National Labor Relations Board under the federal pre-
emption doctrine.31  In resolving this issue the court
reasoned that since Congress had granted the states authority
to enact right to work legislation they must also have given
authority to the state courts to process the violation of such
laws.
Since the Kansas decision, Nevada 32 and Florida 3 3 courts
have held agency shop agreements to be in violation of their
laws. The Nevada case arose in United States District
Court. Chief Judge Ross resolved three basic issues in
construing Nevada's statute: (1) That section 14 (b) of Taft-
Hartley gives the states the power to prohibit the agency
28. Supra note 24.
29. Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., supra note 26, at 464.
30. ]Radio Officers Union v. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Union
Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1957) cert. denied, 342
U.S. 815 (1951).
31. It is not within the scope of this article to comment on the pre-
emption doctrine. For a general discussion of this topic see Cox, Federal-
ism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L.Rev. 1297 (1959); Hays.
State Courts and Federal Preemption, 23 Mo. L.Rev. 373 (1958); Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations.
59 Colum. L.Rev. 6 (1959).
32. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, 202
F. Supp. 726 (D.Nev. 1962).
33. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625 of Retail Int. Ass'n, 141 So.2d 269
(Fla. 1962).
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shop, (2) The agency shop clause is unlawful under Nevada's
right to work provision, and (3) The state courts are not
pre-empted by the NLRB in granting injunctive relief.
Resolving the first issue, Chief Judge Ross looked to the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act and was convinced
that there was no distinction between the union security
arrangement provided for in section 8 (a) (3) of the Act and the
agency shop clause before the bar. By this interpretation
the right to work provision can abolish either agreement. As
to the second question the court had this to say of the Nevada
Attorney General's official opinion:14
The opinion of the Nevada Attorney General has
a two-fold significance. First. The Nevada courts
will give weight to a construction of a statute by the
executive department . . . . We find it difficult to
believe that the Legislature was not aware of the
construction which had been placed upon the statute
... . Its acquiescence, viewed either in terms of
refusal to repeal or in failing to amend so as to
overrule the executive construction (at a time when
the subject of union-security agreements was before
it), should not be totally ignored.
35
On the issue of whether or not state courts could, by affirm-
ative action such as an injunction, enforce the state policy
against the agency shop, the court looked to the congressional
history of section 14 (b) and said that it "removes any lingering
doubt that the state cannot only ban union security agreements
but may also enforce the state policy".36
The Florida Supreme Court in the Schmerhorn case
37
hastened to add support to the extinction of the agency shop
when they granted an employer injunctive relief from such
a provision. In so doing the court declared that their right
to work amendment gave the laborer a distinct freedom and
said:
34. Nev. Att'y Gen. Op. 407 (1962) stated: "To give effect to an 'Agency
Shop' clause embodied in a collective bargaining agreement would render
the Right to Work law nugatory."
35. Supra note 32, at 732.
36. For congressional history the court relied primarily upon H.R.Rep.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) and H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947).
37. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625 of Retail Int. Ass'n, supra note 33.
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This section clearly bestows on the workingman
a right to join or not to join a labor union, as he sees
fit, without jeopardizing his job. Inasmuch as the
Constitution has granted this right, the agency shop
clause is repugnant to the Constitution in that it
requires the nonunion employee to purchase from the
labor union a right which the Constitution has given
him. 3
8
The final test came when for the first time the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the direct issue
of the agency shop and its compatibility with the States'
right to work laws.3 9 The holding of the court supported
Florida's decision by agreeing that section 14 (b) allowed the
state's substantive law to bar the agency shop arrangement.
However, the problem of whether or not the state court
have the power to enforce their decision by granting injunctive
relief was reserved for a future session.
A review of state decisions indicates a growing tendency
to strengthen the right to work statutes, permitting them to
preclude complusory unionism regardless of the manner in
which the agreements are labeled. With the addition of the
Schermerhorn case, it appears that the Federal judiciary will
support any reasonable state interpretation on the subject.
IV. FEDERAL DECISIONS
The early decisions of the NLRB clearly established the
validity of the agency shop under Taft-Hartley. Following a
precedent formulated under the Wagner Act in 1950,40 the
Board in American Seating Company41 decided that since the
language of the Wagner Act was continued in Taft-Hartley,
the legislative history of Taft-Hartley indicated that Congress
"intended not to illegalize the practice of obtaining support
payments from non-union members who would otherwise be
free riders".
The Supreme Court of the United States interpreting the
same provision declared in 1954:42
38. Id. at 274.
39. Retail Clerk Internat'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 371 U.S
909 (1963).
40. Public Serv. of Colo. supra note 9.
41. 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952).
42. Radio Officers v. Labor Board, supra note 30.
[VOL. 39
NOTES
This legislative history clearly indicates that
Congress intended to prevent utilization of union
security agreements for any purpose other than to
compel payment of union dues and fees.
43
This conclusion had been reached earlier by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the Union Starch case.
4
In light of the above statement, what can the term member-
ship actually mean except that union and agency shops are
synonomous? This necessarily follows if section 8(a) (3)
cannot force membership upon an individual.
Perhaps this question has been settled by the decision
handed down by the United States Supreme Court in a highly
controversial case involving, but circumventing, the Indiana
right to work statute.45"  The case arose shortly after the
Meade decision when the United Auto Workers requested
General Motors to bargain on an agency shop clause to cover
the company's plants in Indiana. 4  The company refused
and alleged that such an arrangement would violate the Taft-
Hartley Act. General Motors further contended "that the
first proviso to Section 8(a) (3) spells out the only type of
agreement, i.e., an agreement limited to conditioning con-
tinued employment upon membership in a labor organization,
that may permissibly infringe upon right guaranteed in
Section 747 and not expose an employer to a violation of
Section 8(a) (3) ".4 The union contended that the first
proviso to section 8 (a) (3) merely defined the outer limits of
permissible union-security arrangements, and further that the
proviso encompasses lesser forms of unionism such as the
agency shop. Both parties agreed that they wanted a
decision from the Board which would definitely indicate
whether or not an agency shop was legal under Taft-Hartley,
thereby eliminating an interpretation of Indiana's right to
work law.
43. Id. at 41.
44. Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, m-upra note 30.
45. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 371 U.S. 908 (1963).
46. General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961).
47. 29 U.S.CA. § 157 which states: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, . . to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a. condi-
tion of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title."
48. General Motors Corp., supra note 46, at 485.
1963]
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In holding the agreement unlawful by a 3-2 majority,
Chairman Leedom in his concurring opinion said:
To hold the agency shop lawful, one would have
to conclude that Congress intended the word "mem-
bership" in Sections 7 and 8 (a) (3) to encompass not
only literal membership, but also other relationships
between employees and the union, in the picture,
while at the same time intending that the same word
in section 14 (b) encompass only literal membership;
or further, that Congress intended the word "member-
ship" to mean one thing in Indiana and a different
thing somewhere else. . . . Thus, the conclusion is
inescapable that an agency shop arrangement, what-
ever its status under Indiana law, cannot be lawful
under the NLRA in a state like Indiana where
employment cannot lawfully be conditioned on literal
membership.
49
The concurring opinion of Board Member Kimball concluded
that to allow the union to collect fees from non-union employ-
ees deprived such employees of equal rights under the contract
since they had no vote in running the organization.
The dissent reasoned in accord with the contentions of the
Union in support of the agreement, and relied heavily -upon
previous interpretation by the NLRB on the subject.
Seven months later the case came up for rehearing and
the Board vacated its previous order in a 4-1 decision.50
When the case came before the United States Court of
Appeals, the court in a per curiam decision construed the
agency shop to violate Taft-Hartley 51 thus reinstating the
Board's original decision. The court decided that the agency
shop and the union shop were two entirely different arrange-
ments; a union shop being premised upon membership in a
labor organization and an agency shop on the contrary based
upon an employee paying charges rather than becoming a
union member as a condition of employment. With this
distinction in mind, the court concluded that the exception
49. Id. at 486.
50. General Motors Corp., 133 N.LR.B. 451 (1961). (Membership on the
Board had been changed and this may or may not have had an effect
upon the decision).
51. General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962).
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provided for in section 8(a) (3) means exactly what it says,
and excepts from the operation of the law only agreements
requiring membership in a labor organization.
This stand taken by the Court of Appeals was reversed
when the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
agency shop was in fact a form of unionism which is not
invalidated by Taft-Hartley.5 2  Justice White speaking for
the court stated that when used in terms of union security
contracts, "membership as a condition of employment is
whittled down to its financial core". His opinion emphasized
that in other contexts there may be a real difference between
the union and agency shop, but he stated that any distinction
for present purposes would be "more formal than real".
V. NORTH DAKOTA'S POSITION
The right to work law of North Dakota was passed by the
legislature on March 13, 1947, and approved on referendum
June 29, 1948. The statute reads as follows:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or nonmember-
ship in any labor union or labor organization, and all
contracts in negation or abrogation of such rights are
hereby declared invalid, void, and unenforceable.
5 3
This statute has never been challenged before the Supreme
Court of the state as to its effect upon the agency shop.
In 1956 the Attorney General of North Dakota issued an
opinion reaffirming a position it took in 1952 in holding the
agency shop valid. The opinion in part read:
We do not think that an agency shop agreement
is in violation of the above law. In the first place,
the right to work under this agreement is not
dependent upon membership . . . in a Union, but is
rather a payment of a fee as compensation for
representation by the Union. Secondly, the employee
enters into the arrangement of his own free will and
the payment of the fee entitles him to Union
52. Supra note 45.
53. N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-14 (1961).
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representation without actual membership in the
Union.
5 4
In 1959 another opinion was rendered which upheld the
agency shop. 5  The opinion digested the decision of Indiana
and compared the Indiana statute to our own. The office
did state, however, that the amount charged of non-members
should be based only on their pro-rata share of the cost of
bargaining, and the dues and initiation fees required of union
members should not be taken into consideration.
The North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act,
enacted in 1961,56 does nothing to solve the problem of the
agency shop because its provisions resemble so closely those
of Taft-Hartley. A special committee appointed to investi-
gate the labor law situation in submitting the Act to the
legislature had this to say about the agency shop:
The Committee believes that the desirability or
undesirability of this arrangement is a matter for
the sound judgment of the Legislative Assembly.
The question is logically related to the "right to work
law". Due to the fact the "right to work law" is
an initiated measure and would require a two-thirds
vote for amendment, it was felt the Committee should
not recommend changes in this legislation. 57
Although there has been no official opinion given in our
state since 1959, a letter from the Attorney General's office
was issued on May 7, 1962 concerning the question. 58  The
letter emphasizes the fact that the court, construing the
Nevada statute, took judicial notice of the executive depart-
ment's stand on the issue, and thereby feels that our Attorney
General also has the approval of our Legislature because of
our Legislature's inaction. Referring to the recent precedent
compiled on the agency shop problem the letter states:
At this time we do not feel that it would be fitting
or proper to change our position on this matter
54. (1954-1956) N.D. Att'y Gen. Rep. 74.
55. (1958-1960) N.D. Att'y Gen. Rep. 155.
56. N.D. Cent. Code, ch. 34-12 (Supp. 1961).
57. CRUM, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LABOR LAWS.
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, (1961) at 28.
58. Letter from Vance Hill, Special Assistant to the Attorney General
of North Dakota, to R. W. Wheeler, May 7, 1962.
[VOL. 39
without a directive from the Legislature or the courts.
While there is at present a division of authority on
this question, most of the authority taking a viewpoint
contrary to the position taken by this office has come
about after we issued our initial view on this agency
shop question.
By this recent correspondence from the Attorney General's
office, we find that North Dakota's position on the agency
shop has remained unchanged since 1952.
VI. CONCLUSION
Acknowledging the existence of the Indiana construction,
the decisions in this area definitely show that the agency
shop is on its way to obsolesence in the right to work
jurisdiction. Considering the rehearing pending on the
Schermerhorn case, the only problem states may have is the
granting of injunctive relief, which would be true if the
litigation was found to be within the exlusive domain of the
NLRB. This turn of events, however, should still lead to the
same conclusion.
Basically the decisions have been founded upon con-
struction and interpretation of Taft-Hartley and of state law.
Legislative history of both have been examined at length to
determine if the "free rider" situation merited attention
during the time of enactment, and this is generally found to
have been one of the dominant arguments of the pro-union
mass.
The status of the agency shop has yet to be officially
established in North Dakota, and it appears that this
uncertainty will remain until the Supreme Court of the state
is called upon to interpret our statute regarding such an
agreement. When the time does arise, seemingly our court
will have three choices: (1) To follow the precedent
established in Indiana and supported by the Attorney General
of North Dakota, (2) Accept that portion of the Nevada
decision which supports their Attorney General's statutory
construction, and base their decision upon executive inter-
pretation thereby assuming a passive role in the problem,
(3) Take notice of the rationale behind the decisions in Kansas,
Florida and Nevada and invalidate such a clause.
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Although the principle underlying the elimination of the
"free rider" is a sound one, it is submitted that the third
choice is the best. To the laborer in a right to work juris-
diction, the agency shop is nothing more than a misnomer
since its only function is to operate as a union shop. North
Dakota by its adoption of a Labor Management Relations
Act clearly showed that it meant to keep the union shop
invalid. 59  To accomplish this purpose, this writer further
submits, the term membership should not be defined on a
literal basis as the Attorney General of the State has done in
the past but should carry with it the implied meaning of assess-
ments. This construction will make the union and agency
shop synonomous. If this is done the agency shop will fall
and North Dakota will truly become a right to work juris-
diction as it has chosen to be.
BENNY A. GRAFF
59. See N.D. Cent. Code § 34-12-02 (Supp. 1961) which is modeled after
Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act but does not leave open the possibility
of a union shop agreement.
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